What explains the perpetuation of political dynasties in democracies? A handful of recent investigations using data from the United States and other candidatecentered electoral environments have pointed to a causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation. However, dynasties exist in party-centered environments as well-and, importantly, the causal mechanisms underlying their formation may differ. In this study, we investigate the relationship between the incumbency advantage and dynasties in the closed-list proportional representation electoral system of Norway using candidate-level data from 1945-2013. A regression discontinuity design reveals that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment. However, although we document a share of dynasties (7 percent) that is comparable to the United States, we find no evidence that either incumbency or length of tenure are important to their formation. This finding suggests some form of internal party organizational network as a mechanism underlying dynastic politics that operates beyond the incumbency advantage.
Introduction
What explains the persistence of elite family dynasties in democracies? Dynasties are, of course, common in non-democratic regimes such as monarchies and personal dictatorships (e.g., Brownlee, 2007; Monday, 2011) , and practically all countries in existence today were at one point in history governed by a hereditary leadership.
1 Democratization and economic development might be expected to diminish the relevance of dynastic family ties in political selection-and yet, throughout the democratized world, and even in advanced industrialized democracies, political dynasties continue to feature prominently among candidates, legislators, presidents, and prime ministers.
2 Recent notable examples include the Clinton and Bush dynasties in the United States, the Trudeau dynasty in Canada, the Nehru/Gandhi dynasty in India, the Park dynasty in South Korea, and the Abe dynasty in Japan.
A growing body of research attempts to explain the mechanisms behind this phenomenon. One explanation points to the dominance and resource advantages of elites in political life more generally (e.g., Pareto, 1901; Mosca, 1939; Hess, 1966) .
3 Once in power, elites have an incentive, and often the means, to maintain their positions of power. The advantages enjoyed by elites are easily transferred to their children, either directly, or by virtue of increased opportunities for education and career advancement. This type of elite dominance theory is likely to have the most power in explaining dynasties in developing democracies, where politicians tend to enjoy much higher standards of living than their constituents, and parties are often weak or personalized. Indeed, a high proportion of dynasties has been documented in the national politics of developing democracies like the 1 In non-democratic contexts, Brownlee (2007) argues that dynastic leadership succession is possible if the party system or selection mechanisms are weak, and the existing power distribution in the broader elite is sustained.
2 We define a "dynastic" candidate as any candidate for national office who is related by blood or marriage to a politician who had previously served in the national legislature or executive (cabinet) (Smith, 2012) . If a dynastic candidate is elected, he or she creates a "democratic dynasty," which we define as any family that has supplied two or more members to national-level office.
3 Hess (1966, p. 3) notes that members of the most prominent dynasties in the United States appear to represent the "best butter" of American society: "old stock, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, professional, Eastern seaboard, well to do."
Philippines (Querubin, 2016) , India (Chhibber, 2013; Chandra, 2016) , and Bangladesh (Amundsen, 2016) .
A second explanation points to the electoral benefits of a dynastic background, suggesting that dynastic ties may function as an electoral advantage in a way that is similar to the well-known incumbency advantage. The incumbency advantage includes the direct advantages of being in office (such as increased name recognition and on-the-job experience), as well as the deterrence of high-quality challengers-though these components are often a challenge to disentangle (e.g., Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2007; Hirano and Snyder, 2009) . It is not difficult to imagine how a dynastic candidate, particularly one who immediately succeeds his or her family member as a candidate in the same district, might "inherit" part of a predecessor's incumbency advantage. The advantage in candidate selection and election enjoyed by a dynastic candidate can thus be thought of as an inherited incumbency advantage (Smith, 2012) .
Most recent studies of the incumbency advantage aim to estimate the causal effect of incumbency on future election outcomes through the use of regression discontinuity (RD) designs applied to close elections, where the "treatment" of winning office can be considered "as good as random" (e.g., Lee, 2008; Fowler and Hall, 2014; Erikson and Titiunik, 2015) . In candidate-centered electoral systems-i.e., where votes are cast for individual candidates rather than party lists-the incumbency advantage is substantial.
In the single-member district (SMD) context of U.S. state-level legislative elections, for example, Fowler and Hall (2014) find that incumbency increases a candidate's probability of victory by 53 percentage points.
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Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009) similarly use this approach to evaluate the causal effect of incumbency on the creation of a political dynasty in the context of U.S. congressional elections. Although holding office does not have an effect on the innate personal characteristics of a politician's child or other relative, it most certainly increases the connections, familiarity with politics, and name recognition that can be taken advantage of by such potential successors. Similar to affiliation with a party label, family names can function as "brands" which convey information to voters at a low cost, helping to cue the established reputation of the family (Downs, 1957; Feinstein, 2010) , and can be especially valuable when party labels are a weak source of information. In the language of the RD-based literature on the incumbency advantage, we can think of the inherited incumbency advantage as the causal effect of holding office on the future political success of a family member.
If personal reputation is important to garnering votes, candidates whose relatives have previously served in public office can capitalize on the name recognition and established support inherited from those relatives. Indeed, existing studies of dynasties in developed democracies as diverse as the U.S. (e.g., Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn, 1969; Laband and Lentz, 1985; Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010) , Japan (e.g., Ishibashi and Reed, 1992; Asako et al., 2015) , and Ireland (Smith and Martin, 2016) have explained the persistence of dynasties by emphasizing the importance of name recognition in elections. In the U.S. case, Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009) estimate that for first-term legislators who just narrowly win their first re-election, the probability of having a family member serve in the future increases by roughly 6 percentage points, on average, and up to 14 percentage points in the South. In the Philippines, where SMD elections are also used, Querubin (2016) finds that candidates who narrowly win their first election are 12 percentage points more likely to have a relative serve in office than runners-up. In other words, dynasty formation appears to become more likely the longer a (potential) founding member holds office, suggesting a "power-treatment" effect acting on the ability of elite families to self-perpetuate.
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These studies provide compelling evidence that incumbency, or length of tenure more generally, is an important causal mechanism underlying the creation of democratic dynasties in candidate-centered environments. However, dynasties also exist in party-centered environments-viz. closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems-where votes are cast not for candidates but for parties, and thus where the name recognition of individual candidates does not carry the same sort of electoral importance as it does in candidate-centered environments. In such contexts, it is less clear how incumbency might relate to the probability of forming a dynasty.
In this study, we investigate the relationship between incumbency and political dynasties in the party-centered environment of closed-list PR elections in Norway. In the process, we first extend the incumbency advantage literature from a candidate-centered environment, where it has been extensively studied, to a party-centered environment, where surprisingly little scholarship exists.
6 Because Norway's closed-list system excludes preferential voting for candidates, voters' decisions are, in theory, based more on evaluations of parties and those parties' policy programs than on the characteristics of candidates on the parties' lists (Carey and Shugart, 1995) . 7 Moreover, a candidate's rank position on the list, and thus how likely he or she is to win a seat, is determined by the party, not voters. How strongly does the winning of office in a party-centered system affect the probability that a candidate will continue to run (and win) in the future? As far 5 Exploiting a natural experiment in the Argentine Congress, Rossi (2015) also finds evidence that longer tenures increases dynastic success. Recent work by Van Coppenolle (2014), however, finds no effect of first-term incumbent re-election on the probability of forming a dynasty using data from historical SMD elections in 19th-century United Kingdom, which suggests that the "power-treatment" effect may not operate in the same way across different contexts.
6 Kotakorpi, Poutvaara and Terviö (2013) find that incumbency yields an 18-percentage-point increase in the probability of an individual winning a seat in the next election in Finland, which uses an openlist PR system with a mandatory candidate preference vote. They find a considerably smaller effect (3 percentage points) in local elections, in line with other studies of the incumbency advantage in the Nordic countries with preference voting (Lundqvist, 2013; Hyytinen et al., 2014) . In Ireland, which uses the single transferable vote (STV) system that is sometimes considered "proportional," Redmond and Regan (2015) also estimate an 18-percentage-point increase in the probability of incumbents winning in the next election. Golden and Picci (2015) analyze incumbency effects for two parties under open-list PR in Italy (1948 Italy ( -1992 , finding that incumbents are more likely to be re-selected, but not re-elected.
7 This does not mean that voters do not recognize or care about candidates, particularly those at the top of their preferred party's list (cf., Bengtsson et al., 2013, pp. 88-89) .
as we are aware, we are the first to investigate the incumbency advantage in a closed-list PR setting. Average percentage of lower chamber MPs, 1995 MPs, -2016 G e r m a n y A r g e n t i n a F i n l a n d I t a l y C a n a d a S o u t h K o r e a U n i t e d K i n g d o m S w i t z e r l a n d N e w Z e a l a n d N o r w a y U n i t e d S t a t e s A u s t r a l i a D e n m a r k I s r a e l B e l g i u m I n d i a G r e e c e I r e l a n d T a i w a n J a p a n I c e l a n d P h i l i p p i n e s We then test whether there is an inherited incumbency advantage under Norway's party-centered PR system. As noted, RD designs have previously been used to identify a causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in the candidate-centered SMD contexts of the U.S. and the Philippines. Norway's closed-list PR system is theoretically more party-centered, yet members of dynasties have accounted for roughly 7 percent of Norwe- and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1987 -1989 1990 -1993 (Folke, 2014) , which takes advantage of the fact that candidates who marginally win or lose a seat can be considered more or less equivalent in all other respects apart from the "treatment" of winning office. As noted, related RD designs have previously been used to investigate the inherited incumbency advantage in SMD elections, but ours is the first study to evaluate the phenomenon under closed-list PR.
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We document a strong incumbency advantage for Norwegian MPs, despite the partycentered nature of elections. However, we find no evidence of an inherited incumbency advantage-our estimates indicate that marginally unsuccessful candidates are just as likely as marginally successful candidates to have relatives run and win office in the future. In comparison to the RD results from other contexts, these findings point toward important country-level or institutional differences in the underlying mechanisms in the formation of dynasties, which may in part help to explain the observed variation in the 9 One shortcoming of the data set used by Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009) is that it lacks information on candidates who never won, so the RD design must be applied to marginal winners and losers in the candidates' first re-election attempts. Querubin (2016) relies on unverified matches based on family names in order to analyze unelected candidates. Our data set improves on these issues, as we include verified family ties for narrowly defeated candidates. We additionally use the matching-on-names proxy method as a robustness check.
overall prevalence of dynasties across democracies. Since election prospects in partycentered systems like Norway depend on party list placement, our findings indicate some form of advantage to both incumbents and potential dynastic candidates that operates through better connections with the local party organization, rather than just better name recognition among voters.
Institutional setting and data
Our data set includes all candidates who ran in the 18 Storting elections held between 1945 and 2013. Unlike the other four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden), Norway's PR electoral system is entirely closed-list-parties provide a ranked list of candidates in each district, and voters cast their ballot for the party list as a whole. Seats are allocated to parties in multi-member districts, and then allocated to candidates in order of their rank on the party list.
10 The candidate selection process within parties is regulated by law. Candidates and their rank positions are determined by local nominating conventions attended by dues-paying party delegates in each district.
The re-nomination of former candidates, including incumbents, is not automatic (Valen, Narud and Skare, 2002) .
The Norwegian party system is well represented by a left-right dimension (Strøm and Leipart, 1993; Narud and Strøm, 2011) . The main cleavage runs between the leftleaning social democratic and the right-leaning conservative camps. The Labor Party (DNA) is the dominant party within the left-leaning bloc, which also consists of the 10 In the 1921 to 1949 period, 150 MPs were elected in 29 districts using the D'Hondt seat allocation method. In 1953, the Modified Sainte-Laguë seat allocation method replaced D'Hondt. Both seat allocation methods are within the class of highest average methods, but Modified Sainte-Laguë mechanically produces a more proportional outcome (Fiva and Folke, 2016) . The 1953 reform also abolished a separation of urban and rural districts, which reduced the number of districts from 29 to 20. Two electoral districts merged before the 1973 election. Since 1973, districts follow county (fylke) borders. Adjustment seats were introduced in 1989 to further increase proportionality. Assembly size has been increased four times since 1921: in 1973 (155 seats), in 1985 (157 seats), in 1989 (165 seats), and in 2005 (169 seats). District magnitude ranges from 4 to 15 seats, with an average of about 8. For an overview of the history of the Norwegian election system, see Aardal (2002) .
Communist Party (NKP), and the Socialist Peoples' Party/Socialist Left Party (SV).
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The right-leaning bloc consists of the Center Party (SP; formerly the Farmer's Party), the Christian Peoples' Party (KrF), the Liberal Party (V), the Conservative Party (H), and the Progress Party (FrP; founded in 1973). We classify these eight parties as the main parties.
12 Party identification among voters has historically been high, at roughly 70 percent in the early postwar period, but has gradually dipped since the 1980s to around 50 percent (Bengtsson et al., 2013, p. 71 ). 12 Online Appendix Figure A .1 shows the development over time in party seat shares. 13 This was done to avoid misidentification of dynasties based on the same individual running in multiple years with slight variations in his or her name. In the case that two or more individuals shared a commonly held name (e.g., Hans Hansen), we distinguished individuals with numerals following the first name (e.g., Hans1 Hansen, Hans2 Hansen, and so on).
Candidates and family ties
14 Many candidates from minor parties run on their party list in multiple districts in the same year, the number of candidates running per election is more modest, from about 1,500 to 2,000 (Online Appendix Figure A .2). We restrict our empirical analyses to the main parties, and supplement the individual-level candidate data with election statistics from Statistics
Norway. 15 Party vote counts at the district level allow us to measure how close individual candidates from these main parties were to winning (losing) a seat, given the number of votes and seats won by each party and each candidate's rank on the party list. The Archive of Politicians contains detailed biographical information for all cabinet ministers, MPs, permanent deputy MPs (who serve in the event that an MP is promoted which inflates the number of candidate observations. This practice is uncommon in the main parties.
15 Over the 1945-2013 period, the main parties won 2,776 seats (8.5 percent of candidates were successful), while the remaining lists won a total of 63 seats (0.4 percent of candidates were successful); 57 of the 63 seats won by non-main parties were won on joint lists with the main parties.
to cabinet or leaves office), and deputy MPs serving at least 100 days during a term.
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Importantly for our purposes, this data set also includes information on family ties between politicians. Figure 2 shows the proportion of Norwegian MPs after each election who were related to a previously elected MP or cabinet minister. For comparison, the figure also plots the proportion in the U.S. House of Representatives over the same time period. In both countries, the proportion of dynasties in the legislature has remained relatively stable-between roughly 5 and 10 percent of members. For our analysis, we focus on the predecessors of the Norwegian MPs and construct a variable, Family member winning future seat, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the candidate has a relative who becomes an MP or cabinet minister in the future. For elected candidates, this variable accurately captures dynastic ties.
For unsuccessful candidates, we lack systematic biographical data unless the candidate served as a deputy, or won a seat in a different election. Luckily, the Norwegian system of designating the runners-up (in terms of list position) as deputies to serve in the event of an MP resignation means that we were able to obtain information on family ties for many marginally unsuccessful candidates. We searched the Internet for biographical information for all remaining unelected candidates who were next in line to win a seat, and included this information in the Family member winning future seat variable. We searched particularly carefully for family ties when candidates shared a last name with a future MP from the same party. This approach delivered several additional cases of family ties. These biographical data go as far back as 1814, the first Storting election, but are most complete for MPs elected since 1945.
OLS estimation using elected MPs
Before proceeding to our main analysis using the RD design, we first explore the overall relationship between political power and dynasty formation (Family member winning future seat) using the sample of MPs elected between 1945-1997 with a simple OLS regression analysis. We stop at 1997 in order to give sufficient time for posterior relatives to appear in the data.
18 In addition to total length of tenure in office before leaving office (Terms served ), we also explore the correlation with having ever been ranked at the top of the party list (First-ranked ) and having ever served in cabinet (Cabinet experience).
The results are presented in Table 1 . Because these power-related variables may be correlated with each other as well as dynasty formation, we first test them separately, then all together. In the final specification in column (5), we include fixed effects for the first year in which the MP was elected, party, and district.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 1 show that Terms served, First-ranked, and Cabinet experience all correlate positively with future dynastic succession. The estimate in
Column (1) indicates that each additional term served is associated with a 1-percentagepoint increase in the probability of forming a dynasty. In Column (2) we see that, while about 6 percent of MPs who were at any time ranked at the top of their party list during their tenure were followed into national-level politics by a family member, this is true for just 2 percent of MPs who were never list leaders. Similarly, the estimate in Column (3) reveals that only 4 percent of MPs with no cabinet experience had a relative follow them into office, compared to 11 percent of MPs with cabinet experience.
In the joint specification, Column (4), there is no longer any statistically significant association between seniority (Terms served ) and having a future relative in parliament or cabinet, and the point estimate is small. The estimates for First-ranked and Cabinet experience are, however, still substantial in the joint specification. These correlations suggest that cabinet promotion and being list leader may be particularly important for form-
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The proportion of MPs with a future relative in office drops off dramatically after 1997 ( Figure A .3 in the Online Appendix), which suggests that, compared to earlier years, there has not yet been sufficient time for posterior relatives to appear in the data. ing a dynasty in Norway's party-centered environment, but beg the question of whether incumbency or length of tenure in office matter at all, in contrast to previous findings in candidate-centered environments. To pin down the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation we rely on a RD design, to which we now turn.
Estimation sample and empirical strategy
In our main empirical analysis, we use an RD design to answer two questions. First, how does the probability of winning a seat in subsequent elections depend on a candidate's seat status in the current election? We refer to this as the incumbency advantage. Second, how does tenure in office affect the probability of having a family member serve as an MP (or cabinet minister) in the future? We refer to this as the inherited incumbency advantage.
Our data sample for the RD estimation is based on candidates (not only elected MPs) running in the 1953-1981 period for one of the eight main parties (13,306 candidate-year observations). 19 We limit the sample to candidates running in this period for two reasons. Candidates can be broadly classified as belonging to one of three categories: 1) candidates with a safe position on the list, 2) candidates with some chance of winning representation, and 3) candidates with virtually no chance of winning. For purposes of implementing our RD design, only the second group is relevant. To pin down this subsample, we start by identifying candidates, for each party, who are either next in line to win a seat (marginal losers), or first in line to lose a seat (marginal winners). Figure   3 gives the frequency of observations as a function of rank distance to the marginally elected. In our sample, 11 percent of candidates are marginal (grey bars in Figure 3, 
1,521 observations).
21 We consider the 84 percent of candidates who are more than one rank position away from winning a seat to be hopeless candidates (white bars in Figure   3 ). The remaining 5 percent of candidates have safe positions on the lists; they finish more than one rank position away from losing their seats (black bars in Figure 3 ). In two-party SMD elections, it is straightforward to measure electoral closeness, since a predefined threshold (50 percent of the total vote count) decides the winner. In multimember PR elections, this is more complicated, since the number of seats a party wins depends on the vote counts of all parties. In this case, there is no predefined threshold for a given party to win an additional seat. As a measure of electoral closeness, Folke (2014) proposes to measure the distance to a seat threshold as the minimum total vote change across all parties that would be required for a party to experience a seat change.
22 To measure how close a marginal candidate was from winning (losing) a seat, we implement
Folke's distance measure, and refer to this as the Win Margin in the following. Figure 4 gives the frequency of observations for the sub-sample of marginal candidates. There is no evidence of any sorting around the threshold for a seat change, a potential problem with the "as good as random" assumption of RD designs in SMD settings (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Eggers et al., 2015) . 23 This is not surprising, since parties/candidates cannot predict ex ante where the seat thresholds are going to be in multi-member PR elections (Fiva, Folke and Sørensen, forthcoming) .
Our baseline empirical specification is a local linear regression of the form:
where Seat i is a dummy equal to one if candidate i wins a seat in parliament in the current election. Equation (1) This measure has also been applied by Fiva, Folke and Sørensen (forthcoming) to study the impact of representation on fiscal policies in Norwegian local governments, and by Cox, Fiva and Smith (2016) to study electoral competitiveness before and after Norway's switch to PR in 1919.
23 Online Appendix Figure A .4 shows McCrary density plots. 24 We cluster standard errors at the candidate level.
i wins a seat in the subsequent election; 3) the total number of Storting terms served by candidate i; or 4) a dummy variable equal to one if candidate i has a family member who ever wins a seat in the future. In the first two cases, β 1 estimates the average incumbency advantage in a "sharp" RD framework.
In our analysis of the inherited incumbency advantage, we consider the third case, where terms served is the outcome variable, as the first-stage equation. This equation
estimates how the total number of terms served (i.e., tenure in office) changes with seat status in the current election. In the fourth case, where family member winning future seat is the outcome variable, β 1 is a reduced form estimate which pins down how the probability of having a family member serving in the future depends on a candidate's seat status in the current election. The local average treatment effect of serving one additional term can be recovered by dividing this estimate by the discontinuity jump from the first-stage equation, i.e., using a "fuzzy" RD framework (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) .
The RD design is expected to deliver "as good as random" variation in seat status when we are sufficiently close to the threshold for a seat change. Hence, it is unnecessary to include covariates capturing candidate characteristics in Equation (1) for identification. In practice, however, it is useful to include them in our analysis, because doing so can reduce the sampling variability in the RD estimator (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . We can also use pre-determined candidate characteristics, like party affiliation, gender, and occupation, to assess the validity of the RD design. There should be no discontinuities in variables that are determined prior to the treatment. The same logic applies to candidates' seat status in preceding elections. To test the validity of our research design, we add covariates successively to the analysis, and also relate current win margins to candidates' seat status in previous election periods (t − 1, t − 2, t − 3, or t − 4).
Results
We first present graphical evidence of the incumbency advantage and inherited incumbency advantage using a common bandwidth of 5 percentage points for Win Margin. In our statistical analysis, we choose the optimal estimation window (bandwidth) around the cut-off suggested by the algorithm developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).
As a robustness check, we also plot the RD estimates as functions of the bandwidth chosen. Figure 5 gives the RD plots based on candidates' contemporaneous (election t) win margin. In the top-left panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if the candidate runs in the subsequent election (t + 1). In the top-right panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if the candidate wins a seat in the subsequent election (t + 1). In the bottom-left panel, the outcome variable is the number of terms served by the candidate.
Graphical analysis
Finally, in the bottom-right panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a family member wins a seat in any future election. We plot local averages of the outcome variables calculated within bins of half a percentage point (scatterpoints), and separate regression lines on each side of the discontinuity. The vertical line represents a zero win margin, and indicates the transition from candidates who marginally lost to those who marginally won.
Visual inspection of the data provides clear evidence of an incumbency advantage.
In the top-left panel of Figure 5 , we see that winning a seat in the current election increases a candidate's probability of running again in the next election. Moreover, the top-right panel of Figure 5 indicates that the probability of becoming an MP in the next election roughly doubles for candidates just narrowly winning a seat in the current election. Note that this calculation includes all candidates who ran at election t (i.e., it is not conditional on running at t + 1). 25 In Online Appendix Figure A .5, we document that the incumbency advantage persists for one subsequent election, but then appears to fade out. 26 The existence of an incumbency advantage implies that winning a seat in the current election increases the number of expected terms served by more than one term. In the bottom-left panel of Figure 5 , we find that this is indeed the case. The total number of terms served appears to jump from about 1.1 to 2.8 at the cut-off. Note: Sample restricted to candidates from the main parties who are less than 5 percentage points away from the seat threshold (N=792). Each bin is for an interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints.
25 While the RD design makes it straightforward to estimate the effect of winning unconditional on running, estimating the conditional effect requires addressing selection into future candidacy (Anagol and Fujiwara, Forthcoming). We do not attempt to address this selection issue here.
26 As expected, we do not find any systematic pattern between current win margin and candidates' seat status in previous elections (cf. Online Appendix Figure A.6) . The jumps at the cut-off in Online Appendix Figure A .6 are small relative to the bin-by-bin variation away from the cut-offs, suggesting that these differences are due to noise.
When it comes to the inherited incumbency advantage, however, the raw data provide no clear evidence that winning a seat has a causal effect on the future political careers of a politician's family members. It appears from the bottom-right panel of Figure 5 that the probability of having a family member winning a seat in the future is about 0.04 for both marginal losers and marginal winners close to the cut-off.
Statistical analysis
In Table 2 , we give the regression results using the optimal bandwidth suggested by the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) algorithm. The optimal bandwidth varies from 4.8 to 6.5 percentage points, depending on the outcome variable analyzed. The first column provides the baseline results based on Equation (1). In Columns (2)- (5), we sequentially add fixed effects for year, party, district, and list rank to the model specifications. Finally, the specification in Column (6) (Kotakorpi, Poutvaara and Terviö, 2013; Redmond and Regan, 2015) , but about half the size of the personal incumbency effect found in the U.S. (Fowler and Hall, 2014) . The incumbency advantage estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level, and is insensitive to the inclusion of controls (cf. Columns 2-6). PR elections enjoyed an increased probability of being re-selected by their party. The results from Panel A in Table 2 , show that this is likely to be an important component of the incumbency advantage in Norway, as well. For a marginally elected candidate in the current election, the probability of being on the ballot four years later increases by about 20 percentage points (Panel A, Column 1). Again, the RD estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level. The RD estimates in Panel A are, however, consistently smaller than in Panel B, suggesting that the "re-selection" mechanism is not driving the incumbency advantage in its entirety.
In Panel C, we provide the results for the number of terms served, which can be considered our first-stage equation. We find that a narrowly won seat increases the number of terms served by 1.7. There is no weak instrument problem-the first-stage F-statistic is large (> 65) in all specifications.
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In Panel D, we provide results for the inherited incumbency advantage. The estimated effects of marginally winning a seat on the probability of having a family member winning a seat in the future are close to zero, and not statistically significant at conventional levels in any specification. Based on the specification with a full set of controls (Panel D, Column 6), the 95% confidence interval ranges from -0.058 to 0.021. Recall that the analyses in Panel D provide reduced form estimates of how the probability of having a family member winning a seat in the future depends on a candidate's seat status in the current election. To get the local average treatment effect of serving one more term we must divide the point estimate by about 1.7 (cf. Panel C). If we implement a fuzzy RD using a bandwidth of 0.065 in both the first and the second stage, the 95% confidence interval for terms served ranges from -0.035 to 0.013. Hence, our results imply that the "power-treatment" effect of incumbency on the probability of forming a dynasty, if it exists at all, is at most around 1 percentage point in Norway's party-centered 28 This is similar to the first stage of Willumsen (2011) . He finds an increase of about 1.5 terms using his alternative RD design on Storting elections in the 1977 to 2001 period. Note that, unlike Willumsen, we do not include any time served as a deputy MP in our measure of terms served. If we alternatively use "ever winning a seat" as an outcome variable, the jump at the cut-off is estimated to be 0.46 (SE of 0.05). Figure 6 displays point estimates and corresponding 95% confidence intervals when varying the bandwidth around the seat threshold from 1 to 15 percentage points using the specification with the full set of controls (Column (6) in Table 2 ). The middle dashed vertical line gives the optimal bandwidth based on the algorithm by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), which we employ in our specifications. For a bandwidth of about half the optimal bandwidth (left-most dashed vertical line) and onwards, the incumbency advantage estimates are always statistically significant, and relatively insensitive to the bandwidth chosen. The estimated inherited incumbency advantage is close to zero and never statistically significant. 
Summary
In sum, our results reveal the existence of a significant incumbency advantage for Norwegian MPs. However, although we document a considerably large fraction of dynasties in parliament-in fact, a proportion comparable to that in the United States-we do not find any clear evidence of an inherited incumbency advantage. In other words, we find no causal effect of incumbency on the probability that a family member will enjoy a future career in politics. Many of the founding members of Norwegian dynasties appear to be high-ranking members of their parties with experience in cabinet. However, in contrast to the findings reported for candidate-centered contexts, it appears that many "failed"
candidates also have relatives who go on to get elected in the future, as shown in Figure 5 .
Since list rank, and thus one's probability of getting elected, depends on the decisions of the party's local nominating conventions, a candidate who narrowly misses out on getting elected might still have close enough ties to party activists to result in his or her relatives' being better placed in future nomination decisions. The fact that candidate selection is by law decentralized to local party organizations may contribute to this network effect (Smith, 2012) . 29 As an additional robustness check, we replaced our verified measure of dynastic ties with a proxy measure that uses common last names of candidates running in the same district or party over time, as in several recent studies on dynasties, including Querubin (2016) and Geys (forthcoming) . While this approach may help to uncover some family relations between pairs of unsuccessful candidates, a potential problem is that the measure is noisy, resulting in imprecise estimates in the RD analysis. In the case of Norway, the proxy does a reasonably good job of identifying verified dynasties, and allows us to identify some likely ties between unelected pairs of candidates. For common last names like Hansen, the name-matching approach overestimates dynastic links (Online Appendix Figure A.9) , so we exclude individuals with the hundred most common last names. We test the effect of incumbency on whether a family member runs and whether a family member wins a seat in any future election in the same electoral district for the same party. The RD estimates based on this proxy measure again provide no clear evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on the future political careers of family members (Table A. 
Conclusion
Political dynasties are a common phenomenon in many democracies, but the exact mechanisms involved in their perpetuation differ depending on the institutional context. Past research on candidate-centered systems has found that incumbency and length of tenure in office have an important causal effect on the formation of new dynasties. That is, for a candidate who is more or less equal in other respects (quality, experience, etc.) to another candidate, simply getting into power or returned to power for more than one term can have a significant impact on the future political prospects of that candidate's family members. A key explanation is that incumbency serves as a "power treatment" that increases name recognition among voters, as well as generating connections to financial donors and other important actors.
However, in the party-centered context of Norway, incumbency alone cannot explain the formation of dynasties, nor can length of time spent in office. Our results indicate that Norwegian MPs do enjoy a "power-treatment" effect for themselves (the incumbency advantage). The implication is that once a candidate is elected, he or she tends to get re-nominated to list positions that are high enough (lower numerically) to secure a seat again in the next election. However, we find no evidence that this effect is relevant for their family members (the inherited incumbency advantage). Many founding members of dynasties occupy privileged positions in their parties that make it difficult to disentangle the treatment of incumbency from other intangibles that make them and their family members attractive to party members and leaders. However, as our RD results indicate, even the family members of losing candidates may sometimes possess the right connections to jumpstart their political careers. This may be because candidate selection is decentralized to local actors, a hypothesis that should be explored further in future research.
Our null finding for the inherited incumbency advantage in the party-centered context of Norway is both theoretically and empirically important for our understanding of dynasties in comparative perspective. Compared to the larger and statistically significant effects that have been estimated in candidate-centered contexts like the U.S. (6 percentage points) and the Philippines (12 percentage points), the null finding from Norway suggests that incumbency plays a smaller explanatory role in the mechanisms underlying dynastic politics in countries with strong party organizations and party-centered voting, in line with the comparative theory laid out by Smith (2012) . This suggests the need for more comparative investigations across different institutional contexts, as well as in other closed-list PR cases such as Israel, where there is an even higher proportion of dynasties than in Norway (Figure 1 ).
Our findings are also relevant to recent research estimating the economic returns to office using RD designs. The seminal contribution was made by Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) , who find that holding office increases the future financial capital of British MPs.
Similarly, Willumsen (2011) finds strong positive income effects in the long term for Norwegian candidates who narrowly win a seat in parliament. Thus, in the Norwegian setting, it appears that narrowly elected candidates themselves tend to benefit both politically (the incumbency advantage we have identified), and economically in the long term. However, while it is possible that winning office will create some economic gains for politicians' family members (cf. Folke, Persson and Rickne, forthcoming), our study provides no support for the hypothesis that incumbency is the key to inheriting political success in the party-centered context of Norwegian elections. .06 1 9 4 5 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 3 Note: Some candidates list more than one occupation; we use both occupations to create the occupation dummies. Candidates with no listed occupation are excluded. Note: Sample restricted to candidates from the main parties who are less than five percentage points away from the seat threshold (N=792). Each bin is for an interval of half a percentage point. Separate regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints. The figure is based on candidates' occupations in the first election they participated. Some candidates list more than one occupation; we use both occupations to create the occupation dummies.
A.2 Using common names to proxy for dynasties
In the main analysis, we use verified family ties to identify dynasties and potential dynasties in our data. A possible shortcoming is that an RD analysis based on verified family ties may overestimate the inherited incumbency advantage, which we happen to find is near zero. Although we are confident about the accuracy of these measures, an alternative approach is to quantify dynastic links based on a proxy measure using common surnames of candidates running in the same district or party over time, as has been done in several recent studies on dynasties, including Querubin (2016) and Geys (forthcoming) . While this approach may help to uncover some family relations between pairs of unsuccessful candidates, a potential problem is that the proxy measure is noisy, resulting in imprecise estimates in the RD analysis.
In the case of Norway, the proxy approach does a reasonably good job of identifying verified dynasties in the data set, and allows us to identify likely family ties between candidates who were never elected. However, Figure in Column 1 correspond to the jumps at the cut-off from Figure A.10. In Panel A, we see that the probability of having a family member running in a future election is estimated to increase with about four percentage points if a candidate wins a seat in the contemporaneous election. Relative to the baseline probability of about 0.15, this effect is non-trivial, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The estimated effects on the probability of having a family member winning a seat in a future election (Panel B) have the expected positive sign. However, the effects are quite modest, around a single percentage-point increase, and not statistically significant at conventional levels. The results are similar if we exclude candidates with any of the thousand most common names in Norway (results omitted for brevity). The implication of this exercise is that, in the case of Norway, there appears to be a significant number of active political families within parties who regularly supply candidates to the parties' lists. Many of the later members of these families will run, and potentially earn prime spots on the list, even if their predecessors did not themselves win a seat.
The plots in Figure A .10 are of the same general format as in the main RD plots above. Again, we have candidates' contemporaneous (election t) win margin on the xaxis. In the left panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a family member runs in any future election in the same electoral district for the same party. In the right panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a family member wins a seat in any future election in the same electoral district for the same party. Again, the RD plots based on these proxy family ties provide no clear evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on the future political careers of family members. Figure A .10: RD plots using proxy family ties.
Note: Sample restricted to candidates from the main parties who are less than five percentage points away from the seat threshold. In the left panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a family member runs in any future election in the same electoral district for the same party. In the right panel, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a family member wins a seat in any future election in the same electoral district for the same party. Candidates with one of the top hundred most common family names in Norway are excluded (N=645). Each bin is for an interval of half a percentage point. Separate linear regression lines are estimated to the left and right of the discontinuity using the underlying data, not the binned scatterpoints.
